TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviation 5
Table of Cases 6
Table of Treaties 6
Table of Other Documents 7
Ⅰ. Introduction 8
Ⅱ. Law and Economics Approach to International Law 11
1. What Is Law and Economics 12
1.1 Price theory 13
1.2 Transaction Cost Economics 14
1.3 Game Theory 15
1.4 Public Choice Theory 16
2. Why law and economics approach to international law? 16
2.1 Why have international lawyers avoided law and economics? 17
2.1.1 Concern of Methodology 17
2.1.2 Concern of Political Bias 17
2.1.3 Concern of Positivism 18
2.2 Applying Law and Economics to International Law 19
2.2.1 Price Theory 20
2.2.2 Efficient Breach Hypothesis 22
2.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics 24
2.2.4 Game Theory 26
Ⅲ. Compliance Theory 27
1. Previous Studies 28
1.1 International Legal Studies 28
1.1.1 Managerial Model 28
1.1.2 Consent-based Theory 31
1.1.3 Legitimacy Theory 32
1.1.4 Transnational Legal Process 33
1.2 International Relations Theories 35
1.2.1 Realism 35
1.2.2 Liberalism 36
1.2.3 Institutionalism 38
2. Law and economics approach to compliance 38
2.1 Simple Models of Cooperation 39
2.1.1 Coincidence of Interest 39
2.1.2 Coercion 40
2.1.3 Pure Coordination 41
2.1.4 Battle of the Sexes 43
2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 45
2.3 Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 47
2.4 Role of International Law 49
2.5 The Three Rs of Compliance 50
2.5.1 Reciprocity 50
2.5.2 Retaliation 52
2.5.3 Reputation 53
Ⅳ. Problems of International Human Rights Treaties 55
1. The Concept of International Human Rights Treaties 55
2. The Three Rs of Compliance 60
2.1 Reciprocity 60
2.2 Retaliation 62
2.3 Reputation 64
3. Other Enforcement Mechanisms 66
4. Empirical Studies 70
Ⅴ. Conclusion 73
Bibliography 75